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This paper asks how Henri Lefebvre’s humanist Marxism can contribute to the 
foundations of a critical theory of communication. It does so by reflecting on 
the role of communication in Lefebvre’s books The Production of Space and 
The Critique of Everyday Life. Lefebvre’s humanist Marxist stress on the role of 
human production in society is the aspect of his theory that can be most 
fruitfully integrated into a critical theory of communication. There are also 
striking parallels between Lefebvre and Raymond Williams’ cultural 
materialism. Lefebvre also anticipated discussions of the commodification of 
the communicative commons. 
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This paper asks: How can Henri Lefebvre’s humanist Marxism contribute to the 
foundations of a critical theory of communication?  
 
Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991) was a French Marxist theorist. He published 72 
books (Elden, 2004, p. 4) on topics such as social space, Karl Marx, dialectical 
materialism, modernity, metaphilosophy, everyday life, structuralism, 
existentialism, urban politics, state theory, globalisation, and social struggles. 
He held professorships at the Universities of Strasbourg (1961-1965) and Paris 
X-Nanterre (1965-1973), among other positions. Some see him as philosopher, 
while others regard him as urban theorist, geographer, sociologist, political 
scientist, or historian. But, there “is only one category he would have accepted 
– Marxist – and all that this implies; that is, being a philosopher, sociologist, 
historian and foremost, politically engagé” (Elden & Lebas, 2003, p. xii). 
 
The Production of Space is Lefebvre’s best known and most widely read work. 
It was first published in French in 1974. He was both a critic of structuralism 
(especially Louis Althusser’s version) and existentialism (especially Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s approach). He joined the Parti communiste français (PCF) in 1928. 
Because of his critique of Stalinism, the PCF excluded him in 1958. Lefebvre 
can be considered the most important French representative of Marxist 
humanism. Stuart Elden (2004, p. 19) characterises Lefebvre together with 
Althusser and Sartre as the 20th century’s central French Marxist and as a 
“polymath in the range of topics he discussed” (p. 4). 
 
The majority of his works remains untranslated into English (Brenner & Elden, 
2009, p. 2), which has certainly limited their reception. The critical theorist 
Stanley Aronowitz (2015, p. 133) argues that because of Lefebvre’s radical 
 
transdisciplinarity and the large influence of Althusserian structuralism that 
opposes Hegelian Marxism and Marxist humanism, for “decades Marxists, 
sociologists and others in the social sciences and philosophy ignored him.” 
Also Lefebvre’s works on globalisation and the state have largely been 
ignored (Brenner & Elden, 2009, p. 2). Lefebvre was much more than a critical 
theorist of space. This excess of Lefebvre always relates to space, while 
simultaneously transcending it. This paper contributes to the discovery of an 
alternative Lefebvre by asking how his works can contribute to the foundations 
of a critical theory of communication. It does so by reflecting on the role of 
communication in The Production of Space and The Critique of Everyday Life. 
I do not claim that Lefebvre was a communication scholar. But given that he 
as humanist Marxist gave attention to human’s social and productive role on 
society, his theory may be one of the traditions within Marxism that we can 
take as an interesting starting point for thinking about a Marxist theory of 
communication. 
 
The essay first gives a brief overview of some aspects of Marxist 
communication theory and its status today (section 2). It then presents an 
overview of Lefebvre’s work (section 3) in order to introduce those interested 
in communication theory to his main body of works. Third, a Lefebvre’s work 
is discussed and situated in the context of critical communication theory 
(section 4). 
 
2. The History and Contemporary Status of Marxist Communication 
Theory 
 
Critical communication studies’ history goes back to the works of Marx and 
Engels. Their notion of ideology and Marx’s concept of fetishism have played a 
role in foundations of ideology critique of mediated communication. Marx, for 
example, stressed the material character of communication, analyzed the role of 
technology – including communication technologies that he referred to as the 
“means of communication” – in capitalism in a dialectical manner, and 
anticipated the emergence of informational and digital capitalism with his 
analysis of the general intellect (see Fuchs, 2016b for a detailed analysis). 
Although Marx dialectically combined a structural analysis of capitalism with an 
analysis of the role of praxis, agency, and social struggles, in the history of 
Marxian-inspired social theory approaches emerged that are either structuralist 
in character (structural Marxism) or agency-based (workerism, class-struggle 
oriented Marxism). A third type tries to dialectically integrate structure and 
agency approaches. 
 
Georg Lukács (1923/1971) tried to based on Marx combine the two approaches 
in his major work History and Class Consciousness. He stressed both aspects 
of class struggle and ideology as reification and reified consciousness. Recently 
it has been stressed that Lukács also made direct contributions to the study of 
language, semiotics and communication, especially in his last books (Fuchs 
2016a, 2018c). Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) philosophy of praxis was established 
at the time of Lukács’ early works. His concepts of culture, organic intellectuals 
and hegemony have in communication theory had major influence on scholars 
such as Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall.  
 
Lukács’ notion of reification had direct influence on the development of the 
 
Frankfurt School’s notion of instrumental reason (Horkheimer, 2004). In respect 
to culture and communication, the concept of instrumental reason has been 
applied to Horkheimer and Adorno’s (2002) critique of the culture industry and 
Marcuse’s (1964) analysis of one-dimensional man that includes a critique of 
one-dimensional language and one-dimensional media. Horkheimer and Adorno 
took a more structuralist approach that was grounded in Marx’s notion of 
exchange-value and focused on the analysis of the negative impacts of the 
universalisation of exchange-value on society and culture. Marcuse shared this 
approach, but tried to dialectically mediate it with an analysis of the role of social 
struggles in establishing potential alternatives to capitalism and the logic of 
exchange-value and the structural limits that activism faces in capitalist society.  
 
Jürgen Habermas took the Frankfurt School’s work into a new direction. He 
applied the notion of instrumental reason and its Lukácsian foundations to the 
analysis of economic and political systems that colonise the lifeworld and 
argued that communication was a missing element in the works of Horkheimer, 
Adorno, and Marcuse. Habermas certainly is the most influential critical 
communication theorist today. However, the Marxian origins of his works, as 
present in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas, 
1991), were later lost and turned into a dualist critique that separates 
communication and domination (Fuchs, 2016a). Habermas conceives of 
communication as dominationless and thereby separates it in a dualist manner 
from structures of domination and exploitation, whereby Marx’s original stress 
on the dialectical character of communication and technology as ambivalent 
forces in capitalism have been lost. Most communication scholars will today 
agree that Habermas is a critical communication theorist, but only a very small 
number will characterise him as a Marxist theorist.  
 
Marxian analysis has also had influence on cultural studies. Stuart Hall (1980) 
has distinguished between the culturalist and the structuralist paradigm of 
cultural studies. The first is represented by the humanist Marxist works of 
Raymond Williams and Edward P. Thompson. The second came about by the 
influences that Louis Althusser’s structural Marxism and the post-Marxist 
approach of Ernesto Laclau and Chantalle Mouffe had on the study of culture. 
Stuart Hall is himself a representative of the structuralist paradigm. He focused 
his analyses on structures of encoding, decoding, articulation and 
representation.  
 
The approaches of E.P. Thompson (1963) and Raymond Williams (1977) can 
be characterised as humanist because they start from human experiences and 
human consciousness that are situated in class relations. But these are not 
purely agency-based approaches that fetishise the individual and social 
struggles. Rather, Williams and Thompson base their analysis of society and 
culture on a dialectic of structure and agency, as evidenced for example by 
Williams’ concept of the structure of feelings and Thompson’s notion of class 
experience that both operate at the two mediated levels of individual 
consciousness and collective consciousness as represented by organizations 
and institutions. 
 
Marxist theory has a 175-year long history and has advanced a complex 
 
multitude of approaches, categories and focuses.1 In light of the prominence of 
the New Left and social movements in the aftermath of the 1968 rebellions, 
Marx and Marxian-inspired theory played a major role in the social sciences and 
humanities and in universities around the world. The rise of neoliberalism, 
postmodernism, and the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened the influence of 
Marx in the social sciences and humanities since the 1990s. But at the same 
time, class inequalities and the economy’s crisis-proneness increased 
progressively, which exploded into the 2008 world economic crisis and political 
crises. Ever since, there has been a large growth of the academic and political 
interest in Marx, culminating in “Marx-year 2018” on the occasion of Marx’s bi-
centenary. Since 2008, there has also been a significant increase of interest in 
and engagement with Marx and Marxian approaches in media and 
communication studies. The new interest in Marx and Marxian-inspired 
communication research has resulted in a significant number of books, articles, 
special issues, reading groups, workshops, and conferences. 
 
Since the start of the new millennium, autonomist Marxism, especially Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s books Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), 
Commonwealth (2009), and Assembly (2017), formed the Marxist approach that 
has most influenced discussions of communication. Hardt and Negri have 
stressed the emergence of a cognitive capitalism that has recomposed the 
working class so that a dominance of immaterial/knowledge labor has emerged 
as well as new forms of the expropriation of the commons (including the cultural 
and digital commons) together with new potentials for the appropriation of digital 
machines for progressive purposes.  
 
In the context of the increased interest in Marxist communication research and 
theory, Henri Lefebvre’s approach offers a distinct opportunity for 
communication theory. His approach allows us to a) re-think the relationship of 
humanism and structuralism as well as of agency and structure, b) think about 
the relationship of space and communication, and c) reflect on the role of 
information and communication technologies in capitalism.  
 
Lefebvre’s approach shares the Marxist humanist perspective and the criticism 
of structuralism, functionalism and Althusserianism with the approaches of E.P. 
Thompson, Raymond Williams, Georg Lukács, and other humanist Marxists. 
Engaging with Lefebvre is therefore part of a larger project that combines 
humanism and Marxism for theorizing communication (Fuchs, 2018b, 2018c, 
2017a, 2016a) and aims at renewing humanist Marxism in order to challenge 
authoritarian capitalism (Alderson & Spencer, 2017; Fuchs, 2018a).  
 
3. Henri Lefebvre’s Theory 
 
The task of this section is to introduce the readers to aspects of Lefebvre’s 
works that matter for communication theory.  There are three aspects in 
Lefebvre’s work that are relevant for a critical theory of communication. They will 
be discussed subsequently in the following three sub-sections: 
a) Humanism and structuralism 
                                               
1 1843 can be taken as a decisive year that marks the beginning of Marxian theory because in 
this year Marx wrote and published the first works that are today still widely read and cited, 
including the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law that includes the famous introduction, where 
Marx characterises religion and ideology in general as “opium of the people” (Marx 1843, 175). 
 
b) The social production of space 
c) Information and communication technologies in capitalism 
 
3.1. Humanism and Structuralism 
 
Lefebvre argues in his book Dialectical Materialism (first published in 1940) 
that like Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the dialectical- 
materialist analysis of society must start with humans producing in society. He 
takes a humanist Marxist perspective that focuses on creativity, activity, praxis, 
Hegelian dialectics, human essence, alienation, and the total human. In 
another place, he adds the importance of human needs to these concepts 
(Lefebvre, 1982, pp. 39-42). Lefebvre stresses that the “problem of man […] is 
central for dialectical materialism” (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 94). He argues that 
Marx’s later economic analyses were “integrated with humanism” (p. 89) At 
that time, Stalinism showed a “deep mistrust” of “Marx’s early writings” (p. 1) 
because they could be read as an anti-Stalinist Marxism. Lefebvre’s 1940 book 
can be read as a Marxist critique of Stalin. 
 
Lefebvre (1982, pp. 18-19) opposes the orthodox Marxist interpretation that 
Marx applied universal dialectical laws to the development of society and 
capitalism. He argues that Marx is not a sociologist, economist, historian, 
anthropologist, philosopher, etc., but all of that and more. And he ascertains 
that “Marx is not a sociologist, but there is a sociology in Marx” (Lefebvre, 
1982, p. 22). Generalising this thought, we can say: Marx is not a sociologist, 
economist, philosopher, political scientist, historian, anthropologist, etc., but 
there is a sociology, economics, philosophy, politics, history, anthropology, etc. 
in Marx. 
 
As a Marxist humanist, Lefebvre has been very critical of structuralist theories. 
Structuralism is a functional reductionism that “gives a privileged status to one 
concept” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 106), namely to structures over agency. Lefebvre 
was particularly opposed to Louis Althusser’s structural Marxism. He argued 
that Althusser’s approach is a “withdrawal into scientism” (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 
38), reducing Marxism to an epistemology that “sideline[s] practice and its 
problems,” is a “fetishistic philosophy of ‘pure’ knowledge,” and results in the 
“elimination of the dialectic” (p. 40). 
 
The Production of Space contains numerous references to language’s role in 
space. This is especially because Lefebvre was a critic of structuralist 
linguistics, a tradition founded by Ferdinand de Saussure and followed by 
authors such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva. 
Lefebvre (1991, p. 5) criticises that in structural linguistics, “the philosophico- 
epistemological notion of space is fetishized and the mental realm comes to 
envelop the social and physical ones.” Authors in this field would presuppose 
“an identity between mental space (the space of the philosophers and 
epistemologists) and real space” (p. 6).  
 
Lefebvre criticises reductionist approaches:  
 
“In its most extreme form, reductionism entails the reduction of time to 
space, the reduction of use value to exchange value, the reduction of 
objects to signs, and the reduction of ‘reality’ to the semiosphere; it also 
 
means that the movement of the dialectic is reduced to a logic, and 
social space to a purely formal mental space” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 296).  
 
He also criticises in this context structural linguistics’ reducationism: “Man does 
not live by words alone” (p. 35); “The systematic study of language, and/or the 
study of language as a system, have eliminated the ‘subject’ in every sense of 
the term” (p. 61). Lefebvre warns that one should not overestimate the social 
and political roles of language: “The Word has never saved the world and it 
never will” (p. 134). 
 
In Lefebvre’s view, structural linguistics subsume space, society and 
everything under language. He, on the other hand, argues that space 
subsumes language. Space is material and humans in its production also 
produce a code and language of space. Lefebvre criticises viewing “the spoken 
and written word” as “(social) practice” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 28). For him, 
language does not precede space, but the production of space follows the 
production of a language and code (pp. 16-18). Lefebvre argues that a theory 
of space should be a unitary theory that sees a unity between the fields of the 
physical, the mental and the social (p. 11). This unity would be constituted by 
the fact that all spaces are produced.  
 
Lefebvre (1991) sees space as a means of production and therefore as part of 
society’s base. Space “is at once a precondition and a result of social 
superstructures” (p. 85). He distinguishes between mode of production on the 
bottom and “the state and the superstructures of society” (p. 85) at the top. 
Space is located as a means of production in the economy and interacts with 
the “superstructures.” For Lefebvre, there are various levels of society: “The 
forces of production and their component elements (nature, labour, 
technology, knowledge); structures (property relations); superstructures 
(institutions and the state itself)” (p. 85). Social space “underpins the 
reproduction of production relations and property relations” and  
 
“is equivalent, practically speaking, to a set of institutional and 
ideological superstructures that are not presented for what they are 
(and in this capacity social space comes complete with symbolisms and 
systems of meaning – sometimes an overload of meaning)” (p. 349).  
 
The spatial code “is a superstructure, which is not true of the town itself, its 
space” (p. 47). 
 
3.2. The Social Production of Space 
 
Lefebvre (1991, pp. 299, 346) argues that a new political economy should be a 
critique of the political economy of space and its production. He wants to 
advance a Marxist approach that does not stress products (structural 
Marxism), but production (p. 26). Like Marx, he starts the analysis of society 
from humans who “as social beings are said to produce their own life, their 
own consciousness, their own world” (p. 68). In production, humans would 
mobilize spatial elements, including resources (materials) and tools (matériel) 
in a rational manner so that they organize “a sequence of actions with a 
certain ‘objective’ (i.e. the object to be produced) in view” (p. 71). Lefebvre’s 
key idea in The Production of Space is that humans not only produce social 
 
relations and use-values, but in doing so also produce social space. In more 
general terms, extending beyond social space to all physical spaces, one can 
say that “each living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in 
space and it also produces that space” (p. 170). In society, humans produce 
social spaces. There is a dialectic of social relations and space: “Social 
relations, which are concrete abstractions, have no real existence save in and 
through space. Their underpinning is spatial” (p. 404). 
 
Social space contains the social relations of reproduction (personal and 
sexual relations, family, reproduction of labor power) and the relations of 
 
production (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 32). Space is not a thing (p. 73) and not a 
container (p. 94). It is a product and a means of production (p. 85). Human 
beings “have a space and […] are in this space” (p. 294). Space “is neither 
subject nor object” (p. 92). It is a “social reality,” and “a set of relations and 
forms” (p. 116). It subsumes products and their interrelations (p. 73). There is 
a dialectic of social space and human action: “Itself the outcome of past 
actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting 
others and prohibiting yet others” (73). Space is part of a dialectic of 
production: “Space is at once result and cause, product and producer” (p. 
142). Social space is “always, and simultaneously, both a field of action […] 
and a basis of action” (p. 191). Social space interrelates “everything that is 
produced either by nature or by society” – “living beings, things, objects, 
works, signs and symbols” (p. 101). 
 
Let us briefly focus on Lefebvre’s concept of the boundary of social space. 
Because of its form, a space is circumscribed (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 181). A 
social space has physical borders and conceptual boundaries that are socially 
produced, but always interpenetrates and superimposes other spaces (p. 86). 
Humans “demarcate, beacon or sign […] space, leaving traces that are both 
symbolic and practical” (p. 192). How are boundaries communicated? Space 
can be marked physically or by discourse and signs so that it becomes a 
symbol (p. 141). On the one hand, it can be nature that “communicates” the 
physical boundary of a space to us. A habitable valley bounded by mountains 
into all directions has natural borders. The valley cannot easily be extended 
physically because the mountains border it. Only if something such as an 
earthquake or rockfall changes the mountain and the valley’s geography can 
such natural boundaries change. Humans in society can intentionally produce 
signs to make objects symbolize and take on specific meanings that are 
culturally created, stored, disseminated, and communicated. The border of a 
nation state is physically marked by blockages of the national territory 
controlled by organs of the state, with the monopoly of violence. It is 
discursively marked by a distinction between citizens and non-citizens, 
communicated in the form of passports that grant access to, and provide 
certain rights within, a national territory. 
 
The passport is a socially produced sign, a symbol of political power that 
constitutes an inside and an outside of the nation state. The physical borders 
of the nation state are the historical results of wars and political struggles. The 
nation state’s physical borders are politically and socially defined and 
produced. A particular natural territory is bounded by political conventions. 
The nation’s physical boundaries are signified and communicated by border 
crossings, territorial maps, world maps, etc. Both the natural and informational 
boundaries of the nation state are political conventions defined by those in 
power. Both the physical border and the passport are symbols that 
communicate closure of the national territory. 
 
Lefebvre distinguishes three levels of social space that are shown in table 1. I 
have gathered characterisations of these spaces scattered across The 
Production of Space. These are collected in the table. Lefebvre distinguishes 
between perceived social practices, conceived representations of space, and 
lived spaces of representation. He argues that a “dialectical relationship […] 
exists within the triad of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived” (Lefebvre, 
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Table 1: Lefebvre’s three levels of social space, based on information 
from: Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 32-33, 38-43, 362, 50, 116, 233, 288 
 
Lefebvre (1991) distinguishes between dominated and appropriated space (pp. 
164-167). A dominated space is “a master’s project” (p. 165). In capitalism, the 
nation state (a bounded territory controlled by the monopoly of violence and 
enabling national markets and a power balance between classes and class 
fractions, see Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 111-112, 280-281) forms political space. The 
unity of the workplace (the space of work and production), the city (urban 
space), markets and centers of commerce and consumption (spaces of 
consumption, leisure and entertainment) forms economic space. The nation 
state and capitalist space are the capitalist forms of dominated space, spaces 
dominated by state power and the power of capital. The nation state and 
capitalist spaces are instrumental spaces (pp. 281, 306). 
 
Lefebvre argues that capitalism is based on an antagonism between 
conceived, planned space that is organized as abstract space, and the lived 
spaces of everyday life. He writes that this as a result of this antagonism, “lived 
experience is crushed” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 51). Abstract space is the 
organization of abstract labour (p. 49) and exchange (p. 57). It is “the space of 
the bourgeoisie and of capitalism” (p. 57) and “the location and source of 
abstractions” (p. 348) – the abstractions created by abstract labor, money, 
 
commodities and capital (p. 348). The nation state institutes abstract space (p. 
285). It is a relation between things that renders objects’ social nature invisible 
(p. 49). It is a space of calculation and quantification (p. 49). Time in capitalism 
serves “to measure space” – “the time appropriate to the production of 
exchangeable goods, to their transport, delivery and sale, to payment and to 
the placing of capital” (p. 278). Lefebvre introduces the notion of dominant 
spaces: “The dominant form of space, that of the centres of wealth and power, 
endeavours to mould the spaces it dominates (i.e. peripheral spaces)” (49). 
And he ascertains that human beings make spaces by living in them: “The 
user’s space is lived – not represented (or conceived). When compared with 
the abstract space of the experts (architects, urbanists, planners), the space of 
the everyday activities of users is a concrete one, which is to say, subjective” 
(p. 362). It is a “space of ‘subjects’ rather than of calculations” (p. 362). 
Abstract space is based on a logic that fragments and cuts up space (p. 89). It 
results in a creation of sectors, subsystems, and partial logics (p. 311). In 
capitalism, social space is the milieu of accumulation (p. 129). Abstract space 
is a “medium of exchange” (p. 307). The commodity is organized in abstract 
spaces: “The commodity is a thing: it is in space, and occupies a location” (p. 
341). 
 
Commodities are produced, exchanged, and consumed, which results in 
special spaces for their production, exchange and consumption. The 
notion of abstract space clarifies why Lefebvre distinguishes between 
lived and conceived space. He wants to point out that conceived space 
entails the possibility of a dominant group organizing and 
instrumentalizing social space in its interest to achieve advantages at 
the expense of other groups. 
 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978) points out that abstract thought is the equivalent to 
the exchange abstraction in the world of knowledge. Class societies divide 
mental and physical labor in a division of labor. The consequence is 
mechanistic, quantifying, mathematical logic. For Sohn-Rethel, the “unity of 
mental and manual work” (p. 181) is a precondition of socialism. Lefebvre 
applies the critique of abstract thought to the critique of space and argues that 
abstraction in class societies not just produces abstract thought, but also 
abstract space along with it. Conceptual space is a particular form of social 
space, in which human experts produce planning information that guides the 
organization of space. They also live this conception in everyday work 
practices and relations. So, conceived space is a subdomain of lived space. 
Conceived space does not necessarily take on dominant and dominated forms. 
In a socialist society, conceived space is appropriated by human interest in 
such a way that the information that plans space benefits not dominant class, 
but all those living in a space. There is also the possibility of participatory 
design and planning so that citizens are integrated into the planning of the 
spaces they live in. 
 
Marx (1867, p. 165) understands commodity fetishism as the form of 
appearance, in which “the definite social relation between men themselves” is 
presented as “a relation between things”. The commodity appears as natural, 
unsocial and out of history. Commodity fetishism makes it difficult to imagine 
alternatives to capitalism. Marx’s project was the “unmasking of things in order 
to reveal (social) relationships” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 81). He writes: “Fetishism is 
 
both a mode of existence of the social reality, an actual mode of 
consciousness and human life, and an appearance or illusion of human 
activity” (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 81). Lefebvre is interested in a critique of the 
spatial dimension of fetishism. Abstract space hides what it contains with the 
help of “fantasy images, symbols which appear to arise from ‘something else’” 
(Lefebvre, 1991, p. 311). In capitalism, through what Guy Debord describes as 
the society of the spectacle, “the visual gains the upper hand over the other 
senses” (p. 286). 
 
Abstract space is contradictory space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 306). Lefebvre 
identifies contradictions between dominant space vs dominated space; 
instrumental space vs differential, appropriated space; abstract, conceived 
space vs lived space; and center vs periphery. For Lefebvre, the principal 
contradiction that subsumes the one between center and periphery is the one 
between globalising space and fragmented space: 
 
“Where then is the principal contradiction to be found? Between the 
capacity to conceive of and treat space on a global (or worldwide) 
scale on the one hand, and its fragmentation by a multiplicity of 
procedures or processes, all fragmentary themselves, on the other. 
Taking the broadest possible view, we find mathematics, logic and 
strategy, which make it possible to represent instrumental space, 
with its homogeneous – or better, homogenizing – character. This 
fetishized space, elevated to the rank of mental space by 
epistemology, implies and embodies an ideology – that of the 
primacy of abstract unity. Not that this makes fragmentation any less 
'operational'. It is reinforced not only by administrative subdivision, 
not only by scientific and technical specialization, but also – indeed 
most of all – by the retail selling of space (in lots).” (Lefebvre, 1991, 
p. 355) 
 
Capitalism has a tendency to globalize the economy in order to make use of 
strategic spatial advantages (resources, price of labor-power, political climate, 
etc.) for accumulation. At the same time, it creates ever more specialized 
instrumental spaces. Capitalism fragments space and interconnects the 
fragments at the regional, national, international, and global levels. This 
contradiction would be the spatial expression of what Marx (1867) terms the 
contradiction between productive forces and relations of production (Lefebvre, 
1991, p. 357): The development of the means of production allows the 
production of spaces. In capitalism, dominant interests shape social spaces 
and instrumentalize them as means of control, power and capital 
accumulation. Social spaces are via the logic of capitalism turned into abstract, 
dominated, instrumental spaces. 
 
Lefebvre analyzes a capitalist spatial contradiction between the center and the 
periphery. He also sees abstract space as imperialist in character, as the logic 
of the commodity is expansive and tries to “occupy all space” (Lefebvre, 1991, 
p. 219). The result is an imperialist center-periphery geography:  
 
“In the so-called underdeveloped countries, plundered, exploited, 
‘protected’ in a multitude of ways (economic, social, political, cultural, 
scientific), the obstacles in the way of growth and development become 
 
increasingly daunting. Meanwhile, the advanced countries use the more 
backward as a source of labour and as a resource for use values 
(energies, raw materials, qualitatively superior spaces for leisure 
activities)” (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 346-347).  
 
The “centre continues effectively to concentrate wealth, means of action, 
knowledge, information and ‘culture’. In short, everything” (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 
332-333).  
 
3.3. Information and Communication Technologies in Capitalism 
 
In the third part of the Critique of Everyday Life that was published in French 
in 1981, Lefebvre dedicates one remarkable section to “Information 
Technology and Daily Life” (Lefebvre, 2014, pp. 808-825). He warns that we, 
via the rise of the computer, are facing the danger that capitalism’s abstract 
logic of commodification is extended to the realms of information and 
communication. 
 
Information would always have played a role in capitalist markets and 
exchange, but “for many centuries, information as such did not appear on the 
market” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 817). Lefebvre characterises informational 
capitalism: “What is novel about the contemporary world is that there is a world 
market in information, which positively ‘drives’ the other markets, through 
advertising, propaganda, the transmission of positive knowledge, and so on.” 
(p. 817). Information technology faces the “danger of being administratively 
and institutionally controlled either by the national state, or by transnational 
forces” (p. 819).  
 
In The Production of Space, Lefebvre stresses the importance of land for a 
Marxist theory of space. Marxism would have advanced a binary model of 
class oppositions between capital and labor (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 323-325) and 
forgotten the importance of land in capitalism. In contemporary capitalism, land 
would play a crucial role through the commodification of “underground and 
above-ground resources – of the space of the entire planet” (p. 324). He 
distinguishes between markets in land and works: “There are two markets 
whose conquest represents the ultimate triumph of the commodity and money: 
the market in land (a precapitalist form of property) and the market in works 
(which, as ‘non-products’, log remained extra- capitalist)” (p. 342). Here 
Lefebvre points out that the commodification of land and culture/information 
signifies commodification becoming ultimate. 
 
In Information Technology and Daily Life, there is a comparable passage about 
the commodification of information: “Is not information, the supreme commodity, 
also the ultimate commodity? Does it not complete the great cycle of the 
commodity, its extraordinary expansion – in short, the realization of the world of 
commodities in that of the mode of production, in the global?” (Lefebvre, 2014, 
p. 817). Information technology “perfects and completes the world of 
commodities” (p. 818). 
 
4. Lefebvre and Communication Theory 
 
Based on the overview of some of Lefebvre’s works in section 3, we can next 
 
discuss its relevance for theorizing communication. In doing so, we will follow 
the same structure and sequence of topics as used in section 3.  
 
4.1. Humanism and Structuralism 
 
Lefebvre reminds us that society is neither pure structure nor pure practice, but 
a dialectic of social structures and human practices. In respect to 
communication this means that communication is neither linguistic structures 
nor individual speech acts, but a dynamic, complex production process the 
creates and re-creates semiotic and social structures as well as individual 
consciousness and actions.  
 
Today, Manuel Castells is considered as one of the major figures in 
communication studies. He did however not start as a communication theorist, 
but as an urban theorist who was heavily influenced by Althusser’s structural 
Marxism. Castells (1977) elaborated a structuralist approach of space and the 
urban that is explicitly directed against Lefebvre. Castells argues that 
“Lefebvrian humanism” assumes that “society creates space” and that space 
and society are “the ever-original work of that freedom of creation that is the 
attribute of Man, and the spontaneous expression of his desire” (p. 92). He 
claims that Lefebvre assumes the “spontaneism of social action and the 
dependence of space upon it” (p. 92). Castells argues that to start with the 
human being means a voluntarist theory that ignores any influence and 
structural conditioning of action. Heoverlooks that to start social theory with the 
human who produces society implies that the human is the social being. With 
the human, the social – and therefore also social relations and social structures 
– is immediately posited. Lefebvre shows that one cannot think about the 
human without the dialectic of structures and agency.  
 
Castells takes an Althusserian approach, in which the “relation between society 
and space” is “a function of the specific organization of modes of production 
that coexist historically (with a predominance of one over the others) in a 
concrete social formation, and of the internal structure of each of these modes 
of production” (Castells, 1977, p. 64). In contrast to Lefebvre, Castells reduces 
the structure/agency-dialectic to structures and sees “space as an expression 
of the social structure” (p. 126). 
 
Although Lefebvre elaborates a fairly dialectical theory, The Production of 
Space is not free from functionalist formulations, in which not humans, but 
structures or things, act. Lefebvre writes for example: “[E]very society […] 
produces a space, its own space” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 31); the “ancient city had 
its own spatial practice” (p. 31); “Representational space is alive: it speaks” (p. 
42); “Peasant houses and villages speak” (p. 165). Space is not a subject that 
acts. Rather humans are the subjects who speak to each other within, 
conditioned by and through producing social space. To be fair, one must say 
that such problematic formulations are the exception from the rule in 
Lefebvre’s works that overall strives to conceive of social space and society as 
a dialectic of structure and agency. 
 
Marx’s understanding of the materialist character of society is that humans are 
“living human individuals” who “produce their means of subsistence” and 
thereby “their material life” and “a definite mode of life” (Marx & Engels, 1998, 
 
p. 37). Humans in their social production of life produce and reproduce sociality 
itself, which includes language as a means of communicative production and 
social relations. In communication, humans create and maintain social 
relations by making use of language. Communication takes place in, and 
creates, social space. 
 
Lefebvre’s approach poses the question what kind of space consciousness is. 
If one assumes that consciousness is not simply individual, but necessarily 
social, then this implies that language is not simply a mental space. Any 
language that is not concretely lived is non-existent. Language is a 
communicative means of production that humans use in the communication 
process for creating and reproducing social relations. Communication is the 
concrete process that connects social space and mental space, society and 
the individual. Raymond Williams (2005, pp. 50-63) in this context points 
towards the material character of communication by stressing that means of 
communication are means of production. Languages are “forms of social 
production” that make use of the human body’s resources, whereas other 
means of communication use “non-human material” (Williams, 2005, p. 55; 
see also Williams, 1981, pp. 87-90). Because of his scepticism of structural 
linguistics, Lefebvre somewhat underestimates the material character of 
language and communication. 
 
Classical Marxist approaches have separated base and superstructure, the 
economy and culture, work and discourse, labor and ideology. This separation 
does not hold because of two arguments: 
1) The material unity of society is, as Lefebvre also stresses, that humans 
produce and reproduce their sociality. Just like cars, roads, houses, shops, 
factories, railways, and cities are products of human activities, words, texts, 
songs, culture and ideologies are also human products. The difference is that 
culture can be simultaneously consumed by an endless number of humans, 
whereas a train can only carry a limited number of people. 
2) In the 21st century, culture and communication have become an important 
industry that employs a significant number of people and produces cultural 
commodities. It can therefore not stand outside the economy. As an example, 
8.8% of UK jobs in 2014 were located in the cultural economy (advertising, 
marketing, architecture, crafts, design, IT, film and broadcasting, museums, 
libraries, music, arts, publishing) (DCMS 2015). In London, the share was even 
larger at 16.4%. 
 
In this context, Williams argues that “[c]ultural work and activity are not […] a 
superstructure […] because cultural tradition and practice are […] among the 
basic processes of the [societal] formation itself” (Williams, 1977, p. 111). He 
uses the term “cultural materialism” to signify a position that foregrounds the 
materiality of culture: “Cultural materialism is the analysis of all forms of 
signification, including quite centrally writing, within the actual means and 
conditions of their production” (Williams, 1983, p. 201). Cultural materialism 
argues that consciousness and its products are “parts of the human material 
social process” (Williams, 1977, p. 59). Ideas are created in the human brain 
and always require some physical medium that they are associated with. 
Matter is a process-substance of the world. Natural matter is the object of the 
natural production process, through which nature produces and organizes 
itself as causa sui. Social matter is the object of human subjects in society 
 
and the process of its production. There are qualitative differences between 
natural and social matter. In society, both interact in a dialectical manner 
when humans appropriate and transform nature. 
 
For Lefebvre, the dialectic of society is one between subjects and objects that 
is mediated by activities of social production. This dialectic produces and is 
conditioned by social space in the form of spatial practices, representations of 
space, and spaces of representation (see table 1). 
 
4.2. The Social Production of Space  
 
We can learn from Lefebvre that humans produce and reproduce social 
relations whenever they relate to each other mutually and so make meaning of 
each other and the social world. A social system is a social relation between a 
specific number of humans that is regularised in space and time. It does not 
exist ephemerally, but has some continuity. All social systems have an 
economy, a political structure of governance and a culture. However, for every 
specific system one of these dimensions is dominant. So for example, a 
workplace is an economic social system, but also has certain political rules of 
behavior and a specific work culture. All social systems are dialectics of 
practices and specific structures (use-values, rules, and collective meanings). 
Structures are the properties that make social systems durable, enable and 
constrain the continuity of practices within social systems, and are produced 
and reproduced by these practices. Institutions are large-scale social systems 
that play a key role in society. Both social systems and institutions are more 
enduring features of a society, but institutions have key relevance in society 
and can contain many social systems within them. Examples include the 
parliamentary system, the legal system, the market system, the education 
system, the health care system, etc. A social space is a bounded combination 
of social relations, structures, practices, social systems, and institutions. Every 
social system has its space and is element of larger spaces. When Lefebvre 
says that by producing social relations, humans produce social space, it is 
important to add to that insight that there are various levels of social 
organization that humans re-create in everyday life, including structures, social 
systems and institutions. We could say that space is a bounded collection of 
many subjects, objects, and their relations.  
 





Figure 1: The dialectic of humans – social relations – social space 
 
Humans produce social relations that are bounded, related and organized in 
social spaces. In the production of social relations, they produce and 
reproduce social structures that enable and constrain the practices in social 
systems. Specific social systems form society’s key institutions. Humans 
produce and reproduce social relations, social structures, social systems, 
institutions, and social spaces that in a dialectical manner condition (enable 
and constrain) human practices and are the medium and outcome of such 
practices. 
 
The dialectic of humans and social space, as visualized in figure 1, is 
immanent in Lefebvre’s approach. He does not fully elaborate what the role of 
communication is in social production, which requires that we extend and 
amend Lefebvre’s approach: Social systems, institutions, and social space 
have a more continuous and enduring existence in society. This means that 
they do not necessarily break down if one or more particular individuals is no 
longer a member and so ceases to act in a particular social role. Another 
individual may substitute the one who left. So if in a software engineering 
company a Java programmer leaves, another may be employed who 
possesses the same skills. Social systems, institutions, and spaces are real 
abstractions from individual existence. But given their more abstract 
character, how can they exist? They require being lived by a specific number 
of individuals, who socially relate to each other in everyday life. 
Communication is the process in which structures, social systems, institutions 
and social spaces are lived and thereby reproduced by humans in a concrete 
manner in everyday life. They do so by making use of particular 
communicative means of production (verbal and non-verbal codes/languages, 
information, and communication technologies) that enable the production and 
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reproduction of the social: Humans produce social relations by making 
meaning of each other and thereby reproduce the structures, systems, 
institutions, and spaces that enable and constrain their communication. 
Communication is the way in which humans live and produce social relations 
that, in turn, constitute structures, systems, institutions, and spaces. 
 
Lefebvre speaks of a dialectic of perceiving, conceiving, and living. How 
exactly are these processes related? All social life is a unity of mentally 
perceiving the physical and social world; mentally conceiving this world in 
particular cognitive ways as thoughts; and living the world in social relations in 
which humans communicatively produce themselves, use-values, collective 
decisions, rules, morals, norms, collective meanings, etc. Perceiving and 
conceiving are mental and informational activities. They are social and material 
practices that are part of living and producing a society. Perceiving is the 
mental conception of the lived physical and social world, the cognitive 
production of nature and society. Conceiving is a particular form of perceiving; 
a creative way of living the world by producing information about it. And living 
the world means perceiving, conceiving and producing society.  
 
Given that there is no easy way to separate these processes, Lefebvre’s model 
results in the description of thoughts (the perceived) and information (the 
conceived) as non-social. Perceiving, conceiving and living are all social 
practices, which makes it difficult to call one level of social space “spatial 
practices”. This implies that the other two levels are not forms of practice. The 
three levels are ordered, nested and overlapping. Spatial practice is 
conceptually the most unclear and least utilised level: “[S]patial practices 
mediate between the conceived and the lived, […] spatial practices keep 
representations of space and representational space together, yet apart” 
(Merrifield, 2000, p. 175). 
 
All objects in society take on certain appearances. Their form and content 
represent meanings that are given to them by discourses in society and 
ideologies in heteronomous societies. Via objects, those who control them 
communicate meanings indirectly to those who consume, use or encounter 
these objects. Lefebvre (1991) says in this context that there is a “language of 
things and products” (p. 80). So language is not just a code that enables the 
direct symbolic encounter between humans – also the form and content of 
structures and things can function as symbols and convey meanings to us; 
meanings that specific humans or groups encode into them via symbolic 
production.  
 
In this context, Marx (1867, p. 143) characterises value as the “language of 
commodities.” The price you pay for a commodity (the money-form of value) is 
a symbol that not solely communicates how cheap or expensive it is, but also 
tells you something about the amount of labor that has gone into the product. 
Furthermore, it allows you to distinguish and compare commodities in an 
abstract way. The structural language of objects is not necessarily dominative, 
but can take on a dominative form: 
 
The “language of things is as useful for lying as it is for telling the truth. 
Things lie, and when, having become commodities, they lie in order to 
conceal their origin, namely social labour, they tend to set themselves 
 
up as absolutes” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 81).  
 
There are also political and ideological forms of fetishism in which specific 
institutions or ideas (e.g. the nation, war, racism) are presented as natural 
properties of society, although they only represent particular power relations and 
interests. Fetishism is a particular form of communication in class societies in 
which the social becomes reified and reduced to the status of a thing. This 
reification is communicated as natural property of society. When things 
symbolize something, it appears to us as though they communicate. But 
actually, they only exist and are able to function as symbols because human 
social labor produces them within social relations, and is contained in them. 
Through commodities and markets, the owners, who are the sellers of these 
goods, speak to us and attempt to persuade us to buy. Via the thing-character of 
commodities, they conceal the origin of the goods: the exploitation of labor and 
class relations. Commodity fetishism empties commodities of meanings, which 
creates a void that can then be filled by advertising. It propagates and 
communicates commodity ideologies to convince us that we should consume, 
and that commodities create magic betterments of our lives. Commodity 
fetishism makes it impossible for us to see and communicate with the immediate 
producers, and obscures the fact that producers who organize in the division of 
labor speak with each other. Indeed, it takes a political organization for them to 
come together, formulate and communicate political demands. 
 
Lefebvre’s analysis shows clear parallels to world systems theory. The first 
part of Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) multi-volume book Modern World 
System was just like Lefebvre’s book The Production of Space published in 
1974. Wallerstein (1974) characterises the “capitalist world-economy” as “built 
on a worldwide division of labor in which various zones of this economy (that 
which we have termed the core, the semiperiphery, and the periphery)” are 
assigned “specific economic roles” (p. 162). 
 
In the global space of the capitalist world system, the international division of 
labor takes on a fetishistic form so that workers who produce different parts 
of a commodity in different places are not aware of each other, cannot 
communicate with each other, and cannot politically organize. In digital 
capitalism, we find an international division of digital labor at the heart of the 
production of digital media, in which African slaves, Chinese assemblers, 
highly stressed and highly paid software engineers, precarious online 
freelancers, unpaid digital user workers, etc. constitute the collective digital 
worker (Fuchs, 2014, 2015, 2016c). 
 
4.3. Information and Communication Technologies in Capitalism  
 
Lefebvre’s section on “Information Technology and Daily Life” in Critique of 
Everyday Life bears strong parallels to Raymond Williams’ cultural 
materialism as Lefebvre argues that the production of information renders 
the distinction between base and superstructure superfluous:  
 
“Information is produced. It is consumed. Information technology 
confirms the outmoded character of the classical Marxist contrast 
base and superstructure. Information is not – or not merely – a 
superstructure, since it is an – exchangeable – product of certain 
 
relations of production. What was regarded as superstructural, like 
space and time, forms part of production, because it is a product that 
is bought and sold” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 816). 
 
Such a cultural materialism, as can both be found in Williams and Lefebvre, 
matter today. For example, Edward Snowden’s revelations of the existence of a 
surveillance-industrial complex, in which secret services such as the NSA co-
operate with private security companies and communications corporations 
such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo!, Skype, Apple, etc., shows that 
today the two dangers Lefebvre identified have joined forces and resulted in 
the combined corporate and state control of personal data. 
 
The commodification of information is another important theme in “Information 
Technology and Daily Life.” Nature and communication are both common 
goods that all humans require in order to survive. Every human needs a place 
to live and to communicate in order to survive. You can survive without a car 
because it is likely that you can use other means of transport for travelling from 
point A to B. But you cannot survive without access to land, food and water – 
basic natural resources – and without the communicative interaction with other 
humans. The difference between land and information is that the fruits of the 
land are used up in consumption, and only a limited number of people can live 
on the land. Information, on the other hand, does not deplete. Information can 
be used by an unlimited number of people at the same time. By arguing that 
land and information as commodities signify a new stage in the development of 
commodification, Lefebvre anticipated discussions about the commodification 
of the commons, as discussed in general theories of the commons as well as 
in Marxist theories of the commons (see: Hardt & Negri, 2009; Hess & Ostrom, 
2007). So one here can certainly find parallels between Lefebvre and 
autonomist Marxism.  
 
Information faces a contradiction between commodification and 
commonification. The movement of information becoming a commons 
undercuts the commodification of information. Examples are creative 
commons, file-sharing platforms, open access publishing, open wireless 
communities, free software, Wikipedia, etc. In this context, Yochai Benkler 
(2016) speaks of commons-based peer production in the digital media age. 
But open and gratis access knowledge communities do not necessarily 
undermine commodification. A range of capital accumulation models 
providing gratis access to knowledge, networking, software and online 
services has emerged, but they commodify user data and user activities. 
Google and Facebook are the best examples (Fuchs, 2017b). Communication 
and digital communication are contested realms in which we find complex 




Lefebvre stresses that the production of space also produces a code and 
language and sees communication and culture as secondary superstructures. 
Means of communication are (just like social space) means of production 
through which humans produce social relations and therefore also social 
space. The aspect of Lefebvre’s theory that can be most fruitfully integrated 
into a critical theory of communication is his Marxist humanist stress on the 
 
role of human production in society. Humans produce social relations and 
thereby a dialectic of human action and the production of social space. 
Communication is the concrete dialectical mediation of the individual and 
society. It is the process in which humans produce social relations, structures, 
systems, institutions, and social spaces that enable and constrain human 
action. Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space is a spatial dimension of abstract 
labor and the commodity fetishism. Fetishism and the logic of abstract space 
create the impression that things communicate and act, ultimately hiding the 
social character of capitalism and domination. Information Technology and 
Daily Life bears striking parallels to Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism 
and contains an anticipation of the discussions of the commodification of the 
communicative commons. 
 
Humanist Marxism is not just dialectical in character; it is also a class 
struggle-Marxism that aims at thinking and realising alternatives to capitalism 
and domination. Lefebvre therefore stresses that only class struggle can 
challenge the capitalist domination of space. It can generate differences and 
re-appropriate spaces. In this context, Lefebvre (1991) speaks of differential 
space and counter-space as being alternative. These are communal and 
shared spaces based on “the collective management of space” (p. 103). 
Differential space foregrounds quality of life over quantity (p. 381) and use-
value over exchange-value (p. 410). 
 
Given the commodification of information and information technology, 
dialectical Marxism seeks to identify potential alternatives in the realm of 
information technology. Lefebvre asks in this context: “Is not technologizing the 
social and political, as opposed to socializing and politicizing technology, a 
choice and a decision?” (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 821). And he continues: 
 
“The relations of self-managed units, enterprises or territories, are 
already in conflict with the market and the state. These conflictual 
relations interfere with the relations of these units to information 
technology. Will self-management be realized and actualized by 
acquiring a content and meaning in information technology? Or will 
technological and political pressures reduce self-management to a 
sham? That is the question” (Lefebvre, 2014, p.824).  
 
In the age of digital media, Lefebvre’s work reminds us that digital capitalism 
creates spaces of alienation and that a humane digital society requires a self-
managed and socialized Internet and digital media landscape. 
 
In times when humanity is under strong threat by anti-humane forces such as 
far-right movements, nationalism, authoritarianism and potential new 
fascisms, engaging with the tradition of humanist Marxism that Lefebvre 
belongs to enables reflections on the causes and consequences of society’s 
problems and how social struggles for alternatives can intervene. 
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